



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Berlin Planning (U)

Downgraded to Confidential by the authority of the
Director, Policy & Current Plans
Division (OP-6)
on 3 Aug 90.

1. The recently completed study on Berlin planning is a part of the fall-out of last week's NSC meeting, and answered four questions to the Secretary of Defense. These were the nature of the preparation to be taken, and the timing, to create a capability for -
 - a. A garrison and civilian (QBAL) airlift by 15 October;
 - b. Naval harassment and blockade of Bloc shipping by 15 November;
 - c. Large-scale non-nuclear ground action within four months of such time after 15 October as it may be ordered - with tactical air support, as necessary - to permit the use of two, four, six and twelve divisions in Europe.
 - d. Keeping SAC in a state of maximum readiness for flexible use over a prolonged period of crisis, without degrading its effectiveness.
2. The study shows that we now have the capability for a garrison airlift, but will have to deploy additional MATS units and six tactical fighter squadrons to meet the requirements of the civilian airlift. SAC can implement an airborne alert of up to 1/8 of the combat ready B-52 force without degrading the total alert posture for \$8 million per month direct operating cost, and can improve the alert posture by retention of B-47 wings and tanker squadrons for increased ground alert. Total cost FY-62 about \$154 million, 19,142 military and 3868 civilian personnel. For the Army, there would be basically one division mobilized for each division committed to combat operations in Europe.
3. The Navy's contribution was preparations for harassment and blockade. This is a subject which is legally imprecise, talked about glibly by many without a thorough understanding of the implications. Our study points out clearly that when we start stopping ships on the high seas we must be ready for a war at sea -- since if a ship refuses to stop we must be ready to sink him, and this may start reprisals in the form of submarine warfare, escort by combatant types, or other action against our own ships. The forces we need are shown as the same we included in the Partial Mobilization study.

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ENCLOSURE (1)